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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF STATE OF UTAH 
DAVID M. STAUFFER and CONNIE A. 
STAUFFER, 
Plaintiffs/ Appellants, 
vs 
RUSSELL CALL and VELMA CALL and 
SUNSET CANYON CORPORATION, Case No. 15468 
Defendants/ Respondents. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action by Plaintiffs for specific performance 
_,_ ,,_, """'''~..._.,... -...,._ .• ___ ........ ~'>...,.,.. ..... ___ ._ .. 
of a contract to convey real property, and for partition, 
_._ .............. 
and an action by Defendants seeking to quiet title to the 
-*~"- - . 
real property concerned, and requesting an Order requiring 
Plaintiffs to _ _quit_ the~J~!~m~s. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The case was tried to the Court. Judgment was granted 
to Defendants, the Court ruling that the Uniform Real Estate 
-~--- -·· ·~~------·-
Contract dated 2 January 1969, entered into by the parties, 
was void and of no effect as a contract for the sale of real 
property, by reason of insufficiency of_d_escription therein 
~ -------- -- --
contained. Judgment was also rendered in favor of Plaintiffs 
... _, .... --~-.. 
and against Defendants in the amount of $9,228.00 as of 1 ___ ; 
-----'·T-
September 1977, representing monies paid by Plaintiffs on 
~-- -- ~---·-- --"-,,_--_._,_-- -
the contract, with interest at 6% per annum from the date of 
payment. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellants seek an Order of this Court :._e~ersing the 
Judgment of the trial court and ord_ering that the Unifom 
Real Estate Contract of 2 January 1969, is 'f' 
_ ··- spec1 ically 
enforceable in its entirety as to eight (8) parcels of rea: 
property specifically described in said contract; or that 
this Court reverse the trial court and order that the cont: 
is specifically enforceable in accordance with certain 
descriptions contained in a survey connnissioned by Plainti'. 
or reversing the Order of the trial court and determining 
that the contract is specifically enforceable as to parcel; 
1, 2, 5, 7, and 8 therein described; or, in the event the 
Supreme Court determines that the trial court's Judgment i; 
supported by Utah law, that the Supreme Court change and 
modify Utah law to p:rmit Plaintiffs_ to _select ten (10) 
----·----~- ... ._,.,._ 
acres around two (2) hom~s, to allow Defendants to select 
forty-eight (48) acres of farm land, and to permit t.he 
remainder of the Uniform Real Estate Contract of 2 Januarv 
1969 to be specifically enforced as it stands; or, if the 
court determines that the trial court's Judgment is suppor:: 
by Utah law, that said law be modified and changed by the 
Supreme Court to create a tenancy in counncm in and to the 
eight (8) parcels of real property described in the Uniforc 
Real Estate Contract which is the subject of this action, t 
and between Plaintiffs and Defendants SUNSET CANYON CORPO~l 
the successor in interest of Defendants CALL; or, for an 
to the trial Order of the Supreme Court remanding the case 
court for a new trial. 
-2-
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-STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On or about 2 January 1969, Plaintiffs/Appellants 
STAUFFER and Defendants/Respondents CALL entered into a 
certain Uniform Real Estate Contract. (R259, and Plaintiffs' 
__.... 
Exhibit 17). The wording of the descriptions of the property 
involved was supplied by Defendant/Respondent RUSSELL CALL. 
(Court Proceedings, page 101, lines 23-30; page 102, lines 
1-8). The total purchase price was the sum of $12, 000. _o_o, 
payable in two payments of $1,000.00 each, the balance then 
payable at the rate of $100.00 per month. Plaintiffs/Appellants 
enjoyed the right of accelleration. (Plaintiffs' Exhibit 
18) . 
Plaintiffs/Appellants STAUFFER, with their sixteen 
-....... --~--- -- , -~ .,.,_... ·- .. ·--
children, went into posse~s~~n of the property in~ril, 
1969. (Court Proceedings, page 17, lines 19-25; R259). The 
two homes on the property were unfit for human habitation, 
and Plaintiffs/ Appellants renovated the same for living 
purposes. Other improvements were also placed upon the 
property over a period of years. In general, Plaintiffs/Appellants 
did everything that an intelligent, progressive owner would 
_______ ,__ --·-- ·--~- --· "---•--.. _.. - . .,..,___ ---- ___ .,.. - -
~-- ~o irnprov_e his property. The improvements were substantial. 
(Court Proceedings, pages 47-50; R259-260). Defendants/Respondents 
C~L ~new of the substantial _impr~y_e~e_I}!,'.~ that were being 
made by the STAUFFERS. (R260). STAUFFERS even have a son_. 
_,. .. --- --
---------
buried on the property, w}:ich property was hom_~---~o,_!.h,:m. 
(Court Proceedings, page 115, lines 1-2). STAUFFERS faithfuljy 
made the payments required of tl:_l~~· _in the total amount of 
$6,400 00, through 7 September 1972. (R260). 
-3-
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On or about 22 September ~972, S_TAUF:ERS tendered 
payments of the balance owing, and demanded title, whi , 
--------- ------- _ _ ____ - - ch,_ 
refused by CALLS. (R3, R45). After negotiations failed, 
this lawsuit was filed on 7 March 1973. (Rl). 
CALLS, as had obviously been their intent since refoc, 
to convey the property in 1972, sold_ ~~~-~rop~~:y a seconc 
time to Defendant/Respondent SUNSET CANYON CORPORATION"'." ___.__.------··--.-...~~.. • ,g lL 
1975, (R260) for the price of $60,000.00, exactly 5007,of 
-------· ~ - ~- .. '~ - -~' ., 
the price of the original sale to STAUFFERS. (Court Procel:
1 
page 267, lines 1-30; page 268, lines 1-11). 
At trial, the lower court found the contract to be 
unenforceable due to insufficiency of description, quieteo 
title to the property in Defendants/Respondents, and order; 
all monies paid on the contract to be returned to STAUFm: 
with interest from the dates of payment. (R257-264; R26)· 
268). STAUFFERS now appeal. 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR 
WHEN IT RULED THAT THE UNIFORM REAL ESTATE 
CONTRACT OF 2 JANUARY 1969, WAS VOID AND OF 
NO EFFECT AS A CONTRACT FOR THE SALE OF REAL 
PROPERTY FOR INSUFFICIENCY OF THE PROPERTY 
DESCRIPTION CONTAINED THEREIN, FOR THE REASON 
THAT SAID DOCUMENT FIRST CONVEYED EIGHT 
SPECIFICALLY DESCRIBED PARCELS OF LAND TO 
APPELLANTS, AND CLAIMED AMBIGUITIES ONLY 
AROSE WHEN THE DOCUMENT THEN SOUGHT TO 
PARCEL OUT THE LAND CONVEYED, BETWEEN 
APPELLANTS AND RESPONDENTS CALL. 
Paragraph 2 of the Uniform Real Estate Contract of 1 
January 1969, states: 
· derat~ 
"Witnesseth: that the seller for the consl to ti: 
herein mentioned agrees to sell and con~e~ here!· 
buyer, and the buyer for the consideratio 
-4-
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mentioned agrees to purchase the following described 
real property, situate in the County of Washington, 
State of Utah, to-wit: Andersons' Junction, 
more particularly described as follows: see 
enclosed legal description. (Attached to the 
Uniform Real Estate Contract is a two page document 
entitled "legal description" setting forth eight 
specifically described and surveyable parcels of 
land, together with water rights.) Stauffers to 
purchases two houses using the natural boundaries 
which is approximately ten (10) acres collectively 
plus approximately 1/5 water rights. Calls to 
retain the fenced natural farm ground on the 
SE South side from interstate freeway (which is 
approximately forty acres plus 2/5 water rights. 
The remaining ground SE of the old highway to 
be STAUFFERS along with the two houses. STAUFFERS 
to purchase 1/2 of all remaining property to be 
owned as tenants in cormnon with CALLS. (Words 
in parenthesis added as explanatory note.)" 
Under the doctrine of equitable conversion, the Uniform 
Real Estate Contract conveys to Plaintiffs the eight (8) 
specifically described parcels of property described in the 
annex to the contract. Such parcels are surveyable an~ 
locatable. (R296, page 20, 26-30; and page 21, lines 1-3). 
It is only after such conveyance by the terms of the contract 
itself, that Plaintiffs and Defendants began to discuss the 
idea of varying the interests of each. The "insufficiencies" 
of description upon which the trial court based its ruling 
could only arise following the conveyance of all the property 
to Plaintiffs. Defendants' contention, and the trial court's 
ruling, that the provisions following the specifically 
described parcels are ambiguous, and seeking to declare the 
said provisions void, would, arguendo, void the provision 
concerning the two houses and ten acres of land and would 
aiso void the provision for Defendants to retain the fenced 
natural farm ground of approximately forty acres, and void 
-5-
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any tenancy in common between Plaintiffs and Defend 
ants, 
thus leaving Plaintiffs the sole owners of all the land 
described specifically in the annex to the contract. 
It must be remembered that Defendant RUSSELL CALL 
supplied the language contained in paragraph 2. (Court 
proceedings, page 101, 23-30; page 102, 1-8.). It is . 
ax1c:i 
that language in a written instrument is interpreted aga;;, 
a drafter who executes it. It is equally elementary that 
parties are bound by the language they deliberately use i:. 
such contracts, irrespective of the fact that it appears t: 
result in improvidence, beyond and perhaps in excess of~~·,: 
the mythical, reasonable, prudent man might feel constrab 
to venture. See Skowsen v. Smith, 27 Utah 2nd 169, 493 
P. 2d 1003 (1972). Defendant RUSSELL CALL, having specifk 
supplied the wording used in paragraph 2 of the Uniform Ri,. 
Estate Contract, Defendants cannot now claim that the wore: 
means other than what it says. 
In addition, it is a well known rule of construction 
that the specific controls over the general, and that a 
contract must be construed in favor of its validity as 
opposed to its non-validity. Such construction requires 
that the eight specific descriptions prevail over any 
dispute with those general provisions claimed by Defendanc 
to be ambigious, and therefore, the court's ruling that tt., 
contract was void by reason of insufficiency of descriptio: 
is clearly in error. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR 
-6-
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WHEN IT FAILED TO RULE THAT ANY CLAIMED 
AMBIGUITIES IN THE UNIFORM REAL ESTATE 
CONTRACT WERE CURED WHEN THE RESPONDENT 
RUSSELL CALL MARKED AND APPROVED THE 
BOUNDARIES OF THE LAND DIVISIONS BETWEEN 
APPELLANTS AND RESPONDENTS CALL, THUS 
MAKING THE UNIFORM REAL ESTATE CONTRACT 
FULLY ENFORCEABLE. 
If the Supreme Court fails to accept the argument set 
forth in Point I, then the trial court committed reversible 
error by failing to rule that any defective description had 
been cured by reason of the marking and approving by Defendant 
RUSSELL CALL of the boundaries of the divisions between 
Plaintiffs and Defendants Call. 
A defective description may be cured by the purchasers 
taking possession. Brown v Ward, 81 NW 247, 110 Iowa, 123. 
Such a description may also be cured when the purchaser 
makes improvements. In Ray McKee's Estate, 31 Pitts B. Leg. 
J. N. S. 309. A defective description may also be cured by 
the grantor's marking of boundaries. McKee's Estate, 
supra. 
As is admitted by all concerned, Plaintiffs, following 
2 January 1969, moved immediately into possession of the 
property with the knowledge and consent of Defendants. 
(R259-260). Thereafter, Plaintiffs made substantial improvements 
to the premises. (260) Also thereafter, Defendant RUSSELL 
CALL, in walking over the property, marked the boundaries 
which are set forth in the survey by Gale J. Day. (Court 
proceedings, pages 104-116; Plaintiffs' Exhibit 18; Defense 
Exhibit 2). It also appears that Defendants Call retained 
possession d f h an use o t e fenced natural farm ground, and in 
-7-
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fact, leased it one year to Plaintiffs for the sum of ~ 4 t~ 
Plaintiffs and Defendants having gone into possession ~ 
their respective parcels, having made improvements there:; 
and used the same, and the boundaries of the same having 
thereafter been marked and approved by Defendant RUSSELL 
CALL, and acquiesced in by Plaintiffs, and appropriately 
surveyed by Gale J. Day, any defects claimed by Defendants 
or the court were obviously cured and the .Uniform Real 
Estate Contract of 2 January 1969, is specifically enforc" 
in connection with the specifically surveyable and locata\: 
parcels and the descriptions set forth in Plaintiffs' Exh;': 
18 and Defendants' Exhibit 2. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR 
WHEN IT FAILED TO RULE THAT THE UNIFORM 
REAL ESTATE CONTRACT OF 2 JANUARY 1969 
WAS VALID AND EFFECTIVE AS A CONTRACT FOR 
THE SALE OF PARCELS 1, 2, 5, 7, and 8, THEREIN 
DESCRIBED, DUE TO INSUFFICIENCY OF THE LEGAL 
DESCRIPTION IN SAID CONTRACT, FOR THE REASON 
THAT IF THERE WERE ANY AMBIGUITIES, THE ONLY 
INSUFFICIENCIES IN DESCRIPTION OCCURRED WITH 
RESPECT TO PARCELS 3, 4, and 6, AND THE TRIAL 
COURT SHOULD HAVE HELD THE CONTRACT ENFORCEABLE 
AS TO PARCELS 1,2,5,7, and 8. 
As it appears from the two page document entitled 
"legal description", attached to the Uniform Real Estate 
Contract of 2 January 1969 (Plaintiffs' Exhibit 17) there 
are eight separate legal descriptions. These descriptior.: 
are specific and surveyable. (R296, Reporters Transcript 
page 20, 26-30; page 21, 1-3). These descriptions do no: 
describe a single, contiguous plot of land. They describi 
several distinct and separate parcels. (See Plaintiffs' 
-8-
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Exhibit 19, admitted into evidence by stipulation and without 
objection.) 
The insufficiencies and ambiguities in description 
claimed by Defendants, and considered by the court, arise 
only in connection with parcels 3, 4, and 6, and have nothing 
to do with parcels 1, 2, 5, 7, and 8. 
If there is to be any avoidance of the terms of the 
Uniform Real Estate Contract of 2 January 1969 by reason of 
insufficiency and ambiguity in descripti6n, then such avoidance 
should only take place as to parcels 3, 4, and 6, in which 
the claimed ambiguities arise. Where several distinct 
parcels of land are conveyed, the contract is obviously 
severable. 
POINT IV 
IN THE EVENT THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION 
IS FOUND TO ACCURATELY REFLECT THE STATE 
OF THE LAW IN UTAH, THEN SUCH LAW SHOULD 
BE CHANGED AND MODIFIED TO PERMIT PLAINTIFFS 
TO SELECT THE TEN ACRES AROUND THE TWO HOMES, 
TO ALLOW DEFENDANTS TO SELECT THE FORTY ACRES 
OF FARM LAND AND TO PERMIT THE REMAINDER OF 
THE UNIFORM REAL ESTATE CONTRACT OF 2 JANUARY 
1969, TO BE SPECIFICALLY ENFORCED AS IT 
STANDS. 
In 23 AmJur 2d, DEEDS, Section 225, Grantees' Right of 
Selection, we read, 
"A corrunon law canon of construction under 
which to overcome uncertainty as to the land 
conveyed, the grantee is allowed to select the 
~and conveyed, but not located, has been applied 
in a number of cases, especially those decided 
at a :omparatively early time. Pending the 
exercise of such right, the deed operates to 
convey an undivided interest, conferring on 
the grantee and his successors in interest the 
right of destroying the co-tenancy by exercise 
-9-
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of the right of selection.'' 
It is obvious that this ancient rule of construct· ion 
allowing a grantee to make a selection of land previoosl 
unlocated avoids the unequities inherent in a situations: 
as the present situation, where a grantor himself provides 
the words in the instrument, and then seeks to avoid thei: 
effect by claiming that the words are ambiguous, and later 
resells the property for a much higher price. 
In the case of Calder v Third Judicial District Cour: 
• 
2 Utah 2nd 309, 273 P.2d 168, (1954), this Court recognize: 
that where a contract permits one of the parties to make a 
selection of a fixed quantity of land, leaving to that pa:: 
the selection of the boundaries, the contract is fully va:: 
and specifically enforcable. 
Virginia and Texas hold to the rule that where an 
unidentified portion of a larger tract is conveyed, the 
grantee is automatically entitled to select the boundaries 
of the quantity of the land involved. See Ransome v Watsc: 
Administrator , 134 S .E. 707 (1926), and Turner v Hunt, lli 
S. W. 2d 688 (Texas 1938); House v Humble Oil Company, 97 
S.W. 2d 314 (Texas 1936); and Penney v Booth , 220 S.W. 4J 
(Texas 1920). 
The equities of this case are overwhelmingly in favo: 
of Plaintiffs, who with their large family, went into possi'' 
made two homes liveable, made substantial improvements to 
the rest of the real property, buried their dead there, ani 
made payments, only to find that in the end, Defendants 
had sold to Defendant Sunset Canyon Corporation for a pr::: 
-10-
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tl·mes larger than the original sale price of the land. fi_ve 
Defendants will contend that if Plaintiffs are allowed 
to choose the boundaries of their ten acre tract, then 
Defendants should be allowed to choose the boundaries of 
their approximately forty acre tract of fenced natural farm 
ground. Plaintiffs concur. 
POINT V 
IN THE EVENT THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION 
ACCURATELY REFLECTS UTAH LAW, AND IN THE 
EVENT THAT THIS COURT REFUSES TO ALLOW 
PLAINTIFFS AND DEFENDANTS THE RIGHT OF 
SELECTION, AS SET FORTH IN POINT IV, THEN 
UTAH LAW SHOULD BE CHANGED AND MODIFIED TO 
CREATE A TENANCY IN COMMON IN PLAINTIFFS AND 
DEFENDANTS, IN AND TO ALL LANDS COVERED BY 
THE CONTRACT OF 2 JANUARY 1969. 
In the case of Gibbs v Swift, 12 Cush. 393 (Mass.), in 
Jackson v. Livingston, 7 Wend. 136 (N.Y.), and in L.I. 
Railroad Company v Conklin, 79 N.Y. 572, it is held that 
even where there was an attempt to convey a given part of a 
larger tract of land, and the instrument should fail to 
locate the quantity by a sufficient description, yet, upon 
the delivery of the document, the grantee would become the 
owner as tenant in common with his grantor, with respect to 
the entire tract, in the proportion of the smaller tract to 
the larger tract. 
Plaintiffs urge the Court to avoid the harsh and punitive 
r results reached by the trial court, by adopting the above 
rule. 
POINT VI 
Tl!E COURT ERRED REVERSIBLY IN OVERRULING, 
AND DENYING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR NEW 
-11-
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TRIAL, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, TO AMEND 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
AND JUDGMENT, FOR THE REASON THAT EQUITY 
DEMANDS THAT APPELLANTS' DEFENSES OF LACHES 
UNCLEAN HANDS, BAR AND ESTOPPEL SHOULD HAVE' 
BEEN HEARD BY THE TRIAL COURT IN THE INTEREST 
OF FAIRNESS AND JUSTICE; AND RESPONDENTS 
SHOULD HAVE BEEN BARRED AND ESTOPPED FROM 
CLAIMING THAT THE CONTRACT OF 2 JANUARY 1969 
WAS UNENFORCEABLE IN ANY MANNER. ' 
On or about 6 May 1977, prior to trial, Plaintiffs/ 
Appellants filed a First Amended Complaint, and a First 
Amended Reply to Counterclaim. (R202, R219). On the dayo: 
trial, after receiving a written objection to the filing 
from Defendants/Respondents, STAUFFERS moved that the fik 
be recognized by the trial court. The trial court took tn; 
motion under advisement. (Court Proceedings, page 2, lines 
14-30; pages 3-4). The motion to file the First Amended 
Complaint was later withdrawn by Plaintiffs/ Appellants. 
(Court Proceedings, page 180, lines 1-15). The motion to 
file the First Amended Reply to Counterclaim was not witharc 
containing the additional defenses of laches, unclean hands 
bar, and estoppel. The trial court failed to rule on t~ 
matter either before, during, or after trial, and therefon 
could not consider the defenses raised, to which defenses 
and relief STAUFFERS were entitled. The failure to rule 
upon the motion was therefore an "irregularity in the prociil 
of the court" and would justify a new trial, or amendmento: 
the findings of fact and conclusions of law, and the entry 
I Res pone' of a new judgment, barring and estopping Defendants 
from claiming the existence of any ambiguities which woula 
render the Plaintiffs' Exhibit 17, unenforceable; pursuanr 
to URCP 59 (1). From the facts of this case, it is clear 
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-that the conduct of Defendants CALL could be held to be so 
misleading, so unfair and unjust, or culpably negligent, to 
justify the use of estoppel. 
CONCLUSION 
In view of all of the foregoing, and the equities which 
overwhelmingly preponderate in Plaintiffs' favor: 
1. This Court should reverse the Judgment of the Trial 
Court and order the specific enforcement of the Uniform Real 
Estate Contract of 2 January 1969, in its entirety as to the 
eight (8) parcels of real property specifically described 
therein; or 
2. The Court should reverse the Trial Court, and order 
the contract specifically enforced in accordance with the 
descriptions contained in Plaintiffs' survey; or 
3. The Trial Court should be reversed and the contract 
ordered enforced as to parcels 1,2,5,7 and 8 therein described; 
or 
4. This Court should reverse the Trial Court and amend 
Utah law to permit Plaintiffs to select ten (10) acres 
around the two homes, and to then allow Defendants to select 
forty (40) acres of natural farm ground, and specifically 
enforce the remainder of the contract; or 
5. Utah law should be amended to permit the creation 
of a tenancy in common in and to the entire property, 
between STAUFFERS and SUNSET CANYON CORPORATION, in pro-
portion to the;r ciwnersh;p · 
L L interests; or 
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6. This Court should remand the case to the Trial 
Court, and order a new trial. 
DATED: 23 February 1978. 
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Respectfully submittec, 
MORRIS AND BISHOP 
Telephone: 586-9483 
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